{"id":42451,"date":"2020-07-16T15:56:15","date_gmt":"2020-07-16T11:56:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.msp360.com\/resources\/?p=42451"},"modified":"2021-01-19T14:14:38","modified_gmt":"2021-01-19T10:14:38","slug":"the-evolution-of-cyberwarfare","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.msp360.com\/resources\/blog\/the-evolution-of-cyberwarfare\/","title":{"rendered":"Sam Bocetta: The Evolution of Cyberwarfare"},"content":{"rendered":"

Back in late April, with the world\u2019s media distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic and businesses desperately trying to improve their remote desktop security<\/a>, a number of cyberattacks in the Middle East<\/a> showed us what the future of cyberwarfare might be.<\/p>\n

Up until now, states have consistently denied responsibility for such cyberattacks, no matter how transparent it was that they were the culprits. In addition, there appears to be a new willingness for states to use their cyberweapons to go after private businesses, rather than military targets.<\/p>\n

In this article, we\u2019ll look at what these new attacks mean for cybersecurity, and why they were so surprising to those of us who have spent a lifetime in the business<\/a>. We'll then share some tips on what you need to do to protect yourself against this new breed of attack -- not just in preventing social engineering<\/a>, but also in order to secure your multi-OS environments<\/a> against intrusion.<\/p>\n

\"Sam<\/strong>About the author<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sam Bocetta is a cybersecurity coordinator<\/a> and a freelance journalist specializing in U.S. diplomacy and national security, with emphasis on technology trends in cyberwarfare, cyberdefense, and cryptography. (Email<\/a>, Twitter<\/a>)<\/p>\n

More articles by Sam<\/a><\/p>\n

The Good Old Days<\/h2>\n

In order to understand why the recent attacks are so surprising, it\u2019s worth considering how cyberwarfare worked in \u201cthe good old days\u201d. Twenty years ago (or even a decade ago), there was a widespread view that the value of state-sponsored cyberattacks was their deniability. Even where it was obvious to everyone that an attack had been sponsored by a state, and directed against another, such states remained staunchly opposed to accepting responsibility for them. This approach was seen, for instance, in the attacks that Russia launched against the Ukrainian power grid back in 2016<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This approach was informed by two interrelated factors. The first was that no one was sure whether the concept of \u201ccyber-deterrence\u201d was a safe one. While cyberattacks can be used to show the power and expertise of a state, and potentially dissuade other states from launching preemptive attacks, it was also feared that such \u201cdemonstrative\u201d displays of power would quickly lead to other forms of retaliation, including orthodox military force<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The second consideration, linked to the first, was that there remain no international rules<\/a> governing the legality of state-sponsored cyberattacks. This means that the cyber-theater is dangerously open to rogue states launching cyberattacks with no regard for the consequences. The fear of escalation meant that there was an unspoken agreement between states that attacks would be denied.<\/p>\n

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\"Whitepaper<\/p>\n\"CTA\"<\/a><\/span><\/span>\n<\/div>\n

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